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Abstract
This paper develops a small New Keynesian model with capital accumulation and
government debt dynamics. The paper discusses the design of simple monetary and
ﬁscal policy rules consistent with determinate equilibrium dynamics in the absence of
Ricardian equivalence. Under this assumption, government debt turns into a relevant
state variable which needs to be accounted for in the analysis of equilibrium dynamics.
The key analytical ﬁnding is that without explicit reference to the level of government
debt it is not possible to infer how strongly the monetary and ﬁscal instruments should
be used to ensure determinate equilibrium dynamics. Speciﬁcally, we identify in our
model discontinuities associated with threshold values of steady-state debt, leading
to qualitative changes in the local determinacy requirements. These features extend
the logic of Leeper (1991) to an environment in which ﬁscal policy is non-neutral and
requires us to pay equal attention to to monetary and ﬁscal policy in designing policy
rules consistent with determinate dynamics.
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The literature on the desirable design of macroeconomic policies typically concludes that
operational policy rules should not be a source of non-fundamental ﬂuctuations in economic
activity, implying that the induced rational expectations equilibrium should be at least
locally unique. While this criterion for a good policy design is widely shared, the literature
exhibits a remarkable asymmetry with respect to the analysis of monetary and ﬁscal
aspects of policy rules. Monetary policy rules, typically speciﬁed as interest rate rules
with feedbacks to endogenous variables like inﬂation or output, have been analyzed in
great analytical detail.1 But there is no similarly rich literature on the appropriate use of
ﬁscal instruments.
This asymmetric treatment is adequate in many commonly used models in which ﬁscal pol-
icy acts through variations in lump-sum taxes in an environment of Ricardian equivalence.
In line with the logic spelled out in Leeper (1991), the joint design problem of monetary
and ﬁscal policy-making then essentially reduces to two separable problems which can be
recursively addressed. First, isolated from ﬁscal aspects, there are monetary aspects, as
witnessed by the large literature on the Taylor principle (Taylor, 1993), which typically
establishes solely in terms of monetary policy parameters conditions for local equilibrium
determinacy. Second, if the monetary dynamics are determinate, there is no ‘active’ role
for ﬁscal policy, i.e. the determinacy feature remains preserved if government debt dynam-
ics evolve ‘passively’ in a stable manner. If, however, the dynamic system without ﬁscal
policy exhibits one degree of indeterminacy, then potentially unstable debt dynamics are
needed to restore equilibrium determinacy, consistent with Leeper’s notion of ‘active’ ﬁscal
policy or, alternatively, with the view of the ‘ﬁscal theory of the price level’ expressed in
Woodford (1994), Sims (1994), and Woodford (2003, ch. 4.4).
The main contribution of this paper is to show how this logic needs to be modiﬁed in
an environment which departs from Ricardian equivalence, implying that equilibrium dy-
namics are driven by a genuine interaction of monetary and ﬁscal policy. To this end, we
develop a tractable New Keynesian model in which wealth eﬀects of government debt are
not restricted to the intertemporal budget constraint of the government but fully interact
with all remaining equilibrium conditions of the economy. This implies that government
debt turns into a relevant state variable which needs to be accounted for in the analysis of
local equilibrium dynamics.2 In our analysis, the ‘relevance’ of government debt translates
into two ﬁndings. First, without explicit reference to the steady-state level of government
debt it is not possible to infer how strongly the monetary and ﬁscal instruments within
simple feedback rules should be used to ensure locally determinate equilibrium dynamics.
Second, the determinacy regions depend on the underlying level of debt in a discontin-
uous way such that the determinacy conditions undergo qualitative changes at certain
threshold values of steady-state debt. Reﬂecting the assumed non-neutrality of ﬁscal pol-
icy, these two features overturn the logic of separable monetary and ﬁscal dynamics as
1For representative treatments, see Taylor (1993), Kerr and King (1996), Bernanke and Woodford
(1997), Clarida et al. (1999, 2000), Benhabib et al. (2001a, b), and Woodford (2003).
2We do not adress dynamic properties from a global perspective. Moreover, to allow for an exlusive focus
on government debt, real balances are assumed to be a negligible fraction of total government liabilities.
1sketched above and lead overall to a more symmetric treatment of monetary and ﬁscal
policy aspects.
To make this reasoning precise, the analysis builds on a New Keynesian version of the
model of Blanchard (1985) in which, assuming that all taxation is lump-sum, departures
from Ricardian equivalence can be conveniently modelled through a change in a single pa-
rameter, the probability of death of consumers. Speciﬁcally, Ricardian equivalence ceases
to hold whenever this probability is assumed to be strictly positive, i.e. if consumers are
‘non-Ricardian’.3 Because of the short-sightedness of non-Ricardian consumers, govern-
ment debt aﬀects aggregate consumption dynamics via the Euler equation, and government
debt dynamics are no longer separable from the remaining equilibrium conditions. Mon-
etary and ﬁscal policy are assumed to follow two stylized rules with a deliberately simple
feedback structure. Monetary policy follows an interest rate rule which speciﬁes how the
monetary instrument (i.e. the interest rate) reacts to deviations of actual inﬂation from a
target level of inﬂation. The single policy parameter of this rule is the ‘Taylor-coeﬃcient’
on inﬂation, and monetary policy is called ‘active’ (‘passive’) if this coeﬃcient is larger
than unity, i.e. if the real interest rate rises (falls) in the inﬂation rate. Fiscal policy
follows a debt targeting rule which speciﬁes how the unique ﬁscal instrument (i.e. the
lump-sum tax rate) reacts to deviations of the actual level of real government debt from a
target level of debt. The single policy parameter of this rule is the feedback coeﬃcient of
taxes on debt. In line with Leeper (1991) and, among others, Sims (1998), Schmitt-Grohé
and Uribe (2004), and Davig and Leeper (2005), we call the ﬁscal rule ‘passive’ (‘active’)
if this coeﬃcient is larger (smaller) than the steady-state real interest rate.4
If consumers are non-Ricardian, our analysis of local steady-state dynamics shows that
there exist, depending on the assumed target level of government debt, two distinct stabil-
ity regimes characterized by ‘low’ and ‘high’ steady-state levels of debt.5 In both regimes,
local determinacy regions are not separated by the demarcation lines of active vs. passive
ﬁscal policy-making. Moreover, the two regimes have the feature that there always exist
regions of the parameter space (in terms of the two feedback parameters of the policy
rules) which ensure determinate dynamics at ‘low debt’ steady states, but not at ‘high
debt’ steady states, and vice versa. This feature makes it impossible to infer the ranges of
activism and passivism of both instruments consistent with local equilibrium determinacy
without explicit reference to the prevailing regime of government debt. Intuitively, in our
economy the level of debt fully captures the non-neutrality of ﬁscal policy through the
associated wealth eﬀect in the Euler equation. The relative importance of this wealth
eﬀect, however, varies in the level of debt. In particular, since the process of capital for-
3For the same terminology, see Cushing (1999). In a related, but not identical speciﬁcation Gali et al.
(2004) consider ‘rule-of-thumb consumers’ who intertemporally can neither borrow nor save. Frequently,
the literature refers to this type of consumers also as ‘non-Ricardian’.
4If deﬁned in this way, a passive ﬁscal policy ensures under Ricardian equivalence that government
debt dynamics per se are not explosive, while under an active rule locally stable debt dynamics require the
adjustment of some other variable, like a change in the price level.
5Throughout the analysis, government expenditures are speciﬁed as exogenous and changes in the
steady-state level of debt result from variations in the target level of the lump-sum tax rate. Hence, we
do not compare local dynamics between diﬀerent ﬁscal instruments (i.e. between diﬀerent ﬁscal closure
rules), as done, for example, in Michel et al. (2006).
2mation is endogenous in the model of Blanchard (1985), there exists a link between the
steady-state level of debt and the degree of crowding out of capital. This in turn aﬀects
the steady-state real interest rate which is a key input for the marginal cost schedule of
ﬁrms. In other words, when the capital stock is endogenous, wealth eﬀects of government
debt lead to non-trivial demand and supply eﬀects which allow for qualitatively distinct
dynamics at low and high levels of steady-state debt. Speciﬁcally, in a sense to be made
precise below, our model implies that in the high (low) debt regime the required degree
of ﬁscal discipline increases (decreases) if monetary policy becomes more active. Finally,
we show that this classiﬁcation of local equilibrium needs further modiﬁcations if one also
allows for ineﬃcient steady states.6
These rich ﬁndings contrast strongly with a regime of ‘Ricardian’ consumers, character-
ized by the limiting assumption of a zero probability of death. In this regime, the wealth
eﬀect of government debt in the Euler equation vanishes and the economy converges to
a Ramsey-economy characterized by Ricardian equivalence and separable ﬁscal dynam-
ics. Consequently, government debt is no longer an informative state variable and local
determinacy regions are separated by the demarcation lines of active vs. passive ﬁscal
policy-making, independently of the target level of government debt.
Our paper links to the related literature in a number of ways. First, it needs to be
emphasized that the usage of the terms ‘active’ and ‘passive’ policy-making, unfortunately,
is far from uniform in the literature. In particular, Leeper (1991) himself motivates his
analysis from a generic deﬁnition which classiﬁes a policy as passive (active) if it shows an
(un)responsive reaction to current budgetary conditions. This leads him to the conclusion
that “a unique pricing function requires that at least one policy authority sets its control
variable actively, while an intertemporally balanced government budget requires that at
least one authority sets its control variable passively”.7 From the perspective of such a
more encompassing deﬁnition, active and passive policy reactions, if considered outside
the particular structure of Leeper’s model, are no longer necessarily linked to constant
threshold values of the feedback parameters in both policy rules. In principle, it would be
possible to reclassify our determinacy regions along these lines. However, this would not
aﬀect our main result that under non-Ricardian consumers any such reclassiﬁcation would
be conditional on the level of steady-state debt under consideration.
Second, a number of recent papers have addressed aspects of non-neutral ﬁscal policies
from a related perspective. Cushing (1999), Leith and Wren-Lewis (2000), Benassy (2005),
and Chadha and Nolan (2006) all consider versions of Blanchard (1985) and Weil (1991)
to discuss various properties of monetary and ﬁscal policy rules in environments which
depart from Ricardian equivalence. All these studies, however, abstract from capital stock
dynamics. Because of this feature, supply-side patterns are less rich and none of the
studies reports the existence of thresholds levels of debt which lead to qualitative changes
6Such steady states exist since the steady-state relationship between lump-sum taxes and debt turns
out to be non-monotic beyond a certain threshold value. Beyond this value, the target level of debt no
longer summarizes all the relevant information on which characterizations of stabilization policies should
be conditioned. Instead, the target levels of both taxes and debt need to be made explicit.
7Leeper (1991, p. 132). For a similarly broad generic deﬁnition, see Woodford (2003, ch.4.4) who refers,
however, to the complementary terminology of Ricardian vs. non-Riardian ﬁscal policies.
3in the dynamic properties of the economy, as established in this paper.
Using standard Ramsey-type set-ups, Edge and Rudd (2002) and Linnemann (2006) con-
sider New Keynesian economies in which ﬁscal policy is non-neutral because of distor-
tionary taxation. Both papers show that this modiﬁcation, conditional on the nature and
the degree of the distortion, changes the benchmark of the Taylor principle, but there is
no explicit reference to the role of debt. In similar spirit, Canzoneri and Diba (2005) give
ﬁscal policy a non-neutral role by assuming that government bonds provide transaction
services. Similar to our conclusion, the paper oﬀers numerical results which show that the
aggressiveness of monetary policy which is needed to ensure locally determinate dynamics
depends non-trivially on ﬁscal parameters, but the paper does not report a systematic
role of government debt in this context. Davig and Leeper (2005) extend the original
contribution of Leeper (1991) to an environment with switching regimes which cover all
four combinations of active and passive monetary and ﬁscal policy-making. This feature
implies that shocks to ﬁscal policy aﬀect the dynamics of the price level even if the regime
currently in place would suggest that Ricardian equivalence is satisﬁed.
Third, our paper relates to the growing literature on monetary policy and capital accu-
mulation, as recently summarized in Benhabib et al. (2005). In particular, because of the
continuous time dimension of the model of Blanchard (1985), our ﬁndings can be related
to Dupor (2001) and Carlstrom and Fuerst (2005), and we address this relationship in a
separate discussion in Section 5.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 develops the model economy.
Section 3 establishes the existence of steady states and summarizes the equations which
govern local dynamics around steady states. Section 4 derives the main results of the
paper on the determinacy of equilibria. Section 5 oﬀers a self-contained discussion of
critical aspects of the labour supply speciﬁcation. Section 6 concludes. Technical parts
and proofs are delegated to the Appendix.
2 The Model
Consumers are speciﬁed as in Blanchard (1985) in that they face a constant probability
of death, denoted by ξ ≥ 0. If this probability is positive (ξ > 0),t h ee ﬀective decision
horizon of private agents is shorter than of the government and the model diﬀers through
this channel from a standard Ramsey-type inﬁnite horizon economy. The latter type of
economy, however, can be discussed as a special case if one considers a zero probability of
death (ξ =0 ) .
2.1 Problem of the representative consumer
Ac o n s u m e rb o r na tt i m e ,j, has a constant time endowment of unity per period. In a
representative period, he chooses consumption (c
j
s) and real money balances (m
j
s) in order
to maximize his intertemporal utility function, taking as given the rate of time preference
4θ and a constant probability of death ξ.8 The individual labour supply is inelastically ﬁxed
at n
j
s =1 . We allow for three distinct assets: physical capital, interest-bearing government
debt, and real balances. Later on, when studying the dynamics of the economy, we consider
for simple tractability the cashless-limit. To this end, it is convenient to assume that real
balances enter the utility function of agents in an additively separable manner. Expected






s] · e−(ξ+θ)(s−t)ds, (1)
where χ governs the share of real balances in the consumer’s portfolio (and χ → 0 corre-









consisting of physical capital (k
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s), real government bonds (b
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s), and real balances. The con-










Physical capital and real government bonds are perfect substitutes, earning the same risk-
less real rate of return rs, while real balances depreciate at the rate of inﬂation πs.A s
consumers do not live forever, competitive insurance companies are prepared to pay a
premium ξa
j
s in each period in return for obtaining the non-human wealth of consumers
in the case of death. The individual is paid a real wage of ws and is subject to a lump-
sum tax τ
j
s. Consumers also receive a share of the proﬁts of ﬁnal goods producers of Ω
j
s,





s denotes the co-state variable from the current value Hamiltonian used to solve
the consumer’s problem. Real balances satisfy χ/m
j
s = λj





s/(rs+πs). The co-state variable evolves over time according to
dλj
s = −(rs−θ)λj





s. Integrating the ﬂow budget constraint and imposing the transversality-condition




t (rµ+ξ)dµ =0 ), the intertemporal budget























s − τs) · e−
R s
t (rµ+ξ)dµds.
Integrating the law of motion for c
j
s forward (in order to express c
j
s as a function of c
j
t),
one obtains from the intertemporal budget constraint the individual consumption function
c
j





8As to be discussed below, c
j
s denotes a consumption index of the Dixit-Stiglitz-type, i.e. ﬁnal output
is produced in terms of diﬀerentiated goods (along the unit interval) and ps stands for the corresponding
aggregate price index.
52.2 Aggregate behavior of consumers
Following Blanchard, it is convenient to normalize the population size (and, hence, the
labour force) by assuming that at any moment in time a new cohort is born of size ξ.
Any such cohort born at j has a size, as of time t, of ξ · e−ξ(t−j). Then, the size of the
total population will always be unity, since
R t
−∞ ξ · e−ξ(t−j)dj =1 , implying nt =1for all










with variables without the j-index denoting aggregates. The evolution of aggregate human
wealth follows dht =( rt + ξ)ht − wt + τt − Ωt. Aggregate non-human wealth is given by
at = kt+bt+mt and follows the law of motion dat = rtat+wt−(1+χ)ct+Ωt−τt. For further
reference it is convenient to express the dynamics of the aggregate behavior of consumers
in terms of ct and at. Upon diﬀerentiating ct with respect to time and substituting out for
ht,o n eo b t a i n s




Equation (4) captures the well-known feature that, whenever ξ > 0, the growth rate
of individual consumption (rt − θ) exceeds the growth rate of aggregate consumption,
despite a constant propensity to consume out of wealth for all individuals. The reason
for this is given by the fact that at any moment in time agents with a high level of
non-human wealth are replaced by new-borns with zero non-human wealth. Because of
this generational turnover eﬀect aggregate consumption dynamics in the Euler equation
(4) depend on the aggregate level of non-human wealth (which includes the outstanding
level of government liabilities), in contrast to a standard Ramsey-economy with ξ =0 .Of
course, this is not the only way of introducing non-Ricardian behaviour in a macromodel.
However, it has the advantage of introducing a pure wealth aﬀect in consumption as the
form of deviation from Ricardian equivalence, and moreover, this eﬀect is entirely captured
in a single parameter, ξ, thereby facilitating comparison with a Ricardian benchmark.
Other relaxations of Ricardian equivalence, such as introducing credit constraints (Gali et
al (2004)) or distortionary taxation (Linnemann (2006)), will often be less tractable or
contain direct supply side eﬀects. Nevertheless, such devices are typically intended to have
the eﬀect of allowing ﬁscal policy (and the level of debt) to aﬀect aggregate demand, such
that our approach can be treated as a tractable way of introducing such an eﬀect and, if
desired, can be calibrated to mimic the empirical evidence on the ability of ﬁscal policy to
do this.
2.3 Problems of the representative ﬁrms
We have two types of ﬁrms in our model.
62.3.1 Capital rental ﬁrms
There is a competitive continuum of ﬁrms which accumulate capital for rental to ﬁnal
goods producers. Let it denote the real investment of these ﬁrms, using a mix of ﬁnal
goods which is identical to the private consumption pattern. Moreover, assume that
capital depreciates at the rate δ > 0, leading to the law of motion for the capital stock
dkt = it − δkt.
Capital rental ﬁrms are owned by private households. The return on capital is identical
to the risk-free rate rt if the rental rate of capital (pk
t) charged to the ﬁnal goods sector
satisﬁes the zero-proﬁt condition pk
t = rt + δ.
2.3.2 Final Goods Producers
We assume that ﬁnal goods are produced by imperfectly competitive ﬁrms which are
subject to the constraints implied by Calvo-contracts (Calvo, 1983), such that at any
point in time ﬁrms are able to change prices with instantaneous probability α.F i r m sa r e







Input markets are perfectly competitive. Cost-minimization implies that the combination












w h i c hi sc o m m o na c r o s sﬁrms because of price-taking behavior in the input markets.
Because of the Cobb-Douglas assumption, the cost function is linear in output, with




t γ−γ(1 − γ)γ−1.





where yt is the total demand for ﬁnal goods and ρ > 1 denotes the constant elasticity of
































1−ρ. In line with these aggregators, it is
assumed that investment and public consumption have the same demand structure as private consumption.




















which represents the forward-looking generalization of the familiar static (or steady-state)
mark-up pricing rule p(z)/p = ρ/(ρ−1)MC. The aggregate price index prevailing at time
t can be seen as a weighted average of prices set in the past, where the weights reﬂect the


















)−ρ]yt · e−α(t−s)ds, (5)
with proﬁts distributed to the private sector as speciﬁed in (2).
2.4 The government
Let lt denote aggregate real liabilities of the public sector, consisting of real balances and
bonds, lt = mt + bt. Substituting out for mt, ﬂow dynamics of public sector liabilities are
given by
dlt = rtlt − (rt + πt)mt + g − τt = rtlt − χct + g − τt (6)
where gt = g>0 denotes an exogenous and constant stream of government expenditures
in terms of aggregate ﬁnal output. It is assumed that monetary and ﬁscal policies follow
two stylized rules with a deliberately simple feedback structure. First, regarding monetary
policy, we consider an inﬂation target of zero, i.e. π =0 . Given the nominal stickiness
due to Calvo pricing contracts, the monetary agent has, in the short-run, leverage over
the real interest rate and we consider a feedback rule of the form
rt = r + fM(πt − π), π =0 , (7)
where r stands for the steady-state level of the real interest rate to be derived below. The
single policy parameter fM in (7) is the Taylor-coeﬃcient, as discussed in the literature
on interest rate rules inspired by Taylor (1993). Accordingly, monetary policy is called
‘active’ (‘passive’) if the real interest rate (rt) rises (falls) in the current inﬂation rate, i.e.
if fM > 0 (fM < 0). Since (7) is directly expressed in terms of the real (and not the
nominal) interest rate, the critical value of the Taylor-coeﬃcient is zero (and not unity).
Second, ﬁscal policy follows a feedback rule which aims at stabilizing government liabilities
at some target level l. To achieve this target, lump-sum taxes get adjusted according to
τt = τ + fF(lt − l). (8)
8With gt = g being ﬁxed, the only ﬁscal instrument in (8) is τt. This strong assumption
serves to make departures from Ricardian equivalence in the local equilibrium analysis
below as simple and transparent as possible. According to (6), in any steady-state equi-





implying that the real value of outstanding government bonds must be completely backed
by the present value of future primary ﬁscal surpluses. There are two further comments
worth making regarding the cashless limit to be considered below. First, as χ → 0,t h i s
implies lt → bt, and the feedback rule (8) turns into a purely ﬁscal ‘debt targeting rule’.
Second, with real government debt growing at the real interest rate rt, debt dynamics in
(6) are, per se, locally not explosive if the single ﬁscal feedback parameter fF exceeds the
steady-state interest rate r. Following the logic of Leeper (1991), we call the ﬁscal rule (8)
‘passive’ if fF >r ,while it is ‘active’ in the opposite and non-stabilizing case of fF <r .10
2.5 Summary of equilibrium conditions
For further reference, the conditions which characterize dynamic equilibria at the aggregate
level can be summarized as follows.
Consumers:
dct =( rt − θ)ct − ξ
ξ + θ
1+χ
(kt + lt) (10)
Government:
dlt = rtlt − χct + g − τt (11)
rt = r + fMπt (12)
τt = τ + fF(lt − l) (13)
Firms:










MCt =( rt + δ)1−γw
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10The local equilibrium analysis carried out below is based on approximated laws of motions. For the
analysis to be valid it is assumed that the two feedback parameters f
M and f
Fare suﬃciently close to the
benchmark values of 0 and r, respectively.
9Income identities:
Mutual consistency of the plans of all consumers, ﬁrms, and the government requires that
in equilibrium aggregate ﬁnal output yt satisﬁes the market clearing condition
yt = ct + g + it. (20)
In equilibrium, aggregate output must also satisfy the income identity
yt = wt +( rt + δ)kt + Ωt, (21)
with aggregate proﬁts Ωt of the ﬁnal goods sector deﬁn e da si ne q u a t i o n( 5 ) .B yt h el a w
of Walras, however, (20) and (21) are not independent. If (10)-(20) are satisﬁed, (21) will
be satisﬁed as well if aggregate proﬁts Ωt follow (5). Because of the residual character of
Ωt, w ec a nd r o p( 5 )a n d( 2 1 )f r o mt h ef o l l o w i n ga n a l y s i s .
3 Steady states
3.1 Existence
To enhance the analytical tractability of the analysis we consider from now on the cashless
limit (χ → 0), implying lt → bt. In steady state, p(z)=p, which we normalize to p =1 .
From (18), mark-up pricing implies (ρ − 1)/ρ = MC. Combining (16)-(17), factor prices








(1 − γ)k−γ − δ = r(k), (23)
and w(k) and r(k) tend towards the marginal productivity expressions as the economy
becomes perfectly competitive (ρ →∞ ). Using (23), the remaining equations can be
arranged as a system in c and k. Combining the steady-state version of the consumption
Euler equation (10) with the government’s budget constraint (11), yields






while the steady-state resource constraint is given by
c = k1−γ − δk − g. (25)
Equations (24) and (25) are similar to Blanchard (1985) and can be graphed as in Figure
1(a) to establish the diﬀerences between environments characterized by Ricardian and
non-Ricardian consumers. In the Ricardian limit (ξ =0 ) , wealth eﬀects with respect




















Figure 1: Steady-state conﬁgurations
which is characterized by the modiﬁed golden rule r = θ, independently of the structure
of debt and taxes. By contrast, if ξ > 0 steady states exhibit r>θ, since ‘non-Ricardian’
consumers are more impatient than inﬁnitely lived ‘Ricardian’ consumers. To understand
the non-Ricardian case in further detail, consider initially a situation of a balanced primary
budget, i.e. g = τ ⇔ b =0 . Then, the economy is generically characterized by two steady
states with positive levels of consumption, capital and output, as long as the level of
government spending g>0 is not too large. Holding this level of g constant, an increase
in τ generates a positive level of government debt which at both steady states aﬀects k
and c via wealth eﬀects. Intuitively, government bonds are perceived as net wealth by
currently alive consumers, since the tax burden, backing these bonds, is partly borne by
members of future generations.11 However, the amount of debt that can be passed on
between diﬀerent generations cannot be arbitrarily large. As τ keeps rising, (25) in Figure
1(a) remains unaﬀected, while (24) shifts upward, and there exists a unique value τ(g),
with associated debt level b, beyond which the two steady states cease to exist.
We concentrate in the following exclusively on the high-activity steady state (EH)t o
facilitate a meaningful comparison of our results with the Ricardian benchmark. To ﬁnd
a simple operationalization for this, we make from now on the mild assumption
(A1 )0 <g<γy.
As shown in Appendix 1, under a balanced primary budget (τ = g) any steady state which
satisﬁes (A 1) must be of the high-activity type.12 Importantly, as graphed in Figure 1(b),
11For further details, see, in particular, Weil (1991). The crucial mechanism for this result is not the
probability of death, but rather the ‘disconnectedness’ between consumers currently alive and those born
at some point in the future.
12Assumption (A 1) says that the government expenditure ratio should be less than the Cobb-Douglas co-
11at the high-activity steady state (EH) the relationship between τ and b is non-monotonic
if one increases τ, holding g constant. The intuition for this feature is as follows. As τ rises
the primary surplus τ − g increases. Moreover, the real interest rate increases, since the
wealth eﬀect leads to a crowding out of physical capital. These two eﬀects make the net
eﬀect on the steady-state debt level b, which is given by the discounted value of primary
surpluses (i.e. b =( τ − g)/r)), ambiguous. For τ suﬃciently close to g the ﬁrst eﬀect
dominates and b rises in τ. However, there exists a unique value τ∗(g) which maximizes
the steady-state value of government debt at b∗, while b falls as τ further increases in the
interval (τ∗,τ). For future reference, we summarize this pattern as follows:
Lemma 1 Consider a steady state of (24) and (25) with a balanced primary budget which
satisﬁes 0 <g= τ < γy. Then, by varying τ and holding g constant, there exists a range
of eﬃcient high-activity steady states (EH) characterized by τ ∈ (g,τ∗) ⇒ b ∈ (0,b ∗),
and there exists a range of ineﬃcient high-activity steady states (EH) characterized by
τ ∈ (τ∗,τ) ⇒ b ∈ (b,b∗), as graphed in Figure 1(b).
Proof: See Appendix 1.
3.2 Local dynamics
Upon combining (10)-(20), local dynamics around steady states can be characterized by
a dynamic system in bt,c t,k t,a n dπt. Given the non-linearity of the system, we consider
a ﬁrst-order approximation. Let b xt = xt−x




x for x = b, c, k. As regards
inﬂation dynamics, since π =0 , we consider πt and dπt =
·
πt, respectively.
Starting out from the diﬀerential equations (10), (11), and (14), when combined with the
two feedback rules (12) and (13), it is straightforward to obtain the approximated laws of
motion for b bt, b ct, and b kt :
db bt =( r − fF)b bt + fMπt (26)
db ct = −ξ(ξ + θ)
b
c
b bt +( r − θ)b ct − ξ(ξ + θ)
k
c
b kt + fMπt (27)
db kt = −
c
k
b ct +[ ( 1− γ)
y
k
− δ]b kt. (28)
Moreover, as derived in Appendix 2, inﬂation dynamics can be approximated by the
expression:




The equations (26)-(29) constitute a four-dimensional linear system of diﬀerential equa-
tions. The system is characterized by two state variables (b bt,b kt) and two forward-looking
jump variables (b ct,πt) with free initial conditions, and local dynamics can be assessed by
eﬃcient of labour which is typically assumed to be around 2/3. Hence, (A 1) does not impose a ‘restriction’
that could become binding under plausible calibrations.
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4C l a s s i ﬁcation of local equilibrium dynamics
The next two sections address in turn the implications of (30) for the classiﬁcation of local
equilibrium dynamics under Ricardian and non-Ricardian consumers, respectively.
4.1 Ricardian consumers (ξ =0 )
As discussed, steady states with Ricardian consumers (ξ =0 ) are characterized by the
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Compared with (30), the assumption of ξ =0simpliﬁes the dynamic structure of the
economy in two important ways, both linked to the aggregate consumption Euler equation
as described by the second row in (31). First, since government bonds are not perceived
as net wealth, consumption dynamics are not aﬀected by government debt dynamics,
ξ(ξ + θ)b
c =0 . In fact, government debt dynamics do not aﬀect any of the other three
dynamic equations. As a result of this separability, one eigenvalue of (31) is given by
λ = θ−fF. Second, the absence of wealth eﬀects also implies that consumption dynamics
are not aﬀected by capital dynamics, ξ(ξ+θ)k
c =0 . This leads to a well-known and simple
relationship between the stance of monetary policy (measured by fM) and the proﬁle of
consumption close to the steady state, reﬂecting the assumption of logarithmic utility in
consumption. This relationship says that if in response to some shock inﬂation is above
target (πt > 0) consumption increases (decreases) on impact, whenever monetary policy
is active (passive), while it stays ﬂat if monetary policy is neutral (fM =0 ) .
Exploiting the separability of government debt dynamics, we address ﬁrst the isolated
monetary dynamics before we then turn to the joint monetary and ﬁscal dynamics of (31).
13The notion of a predetermined stock of real government debt can be justiﬁed as follows. First, because
af r a c t i o no fﬁrms sets prices in a forwardlooking manner, the inﬂation rate πt is a jump variable. Second,
assume that the stock of nominal government bonds is predetermined. Then, real government debt must
be counted as a state variable, because it cannot move independently of the jump in inﬂation.
134.1.1 Monetary dynamics
By deleting the ﬁrst column and the ﬁrst row in (31), monetary dynamics can be read-
ily inferred from the remaining sub-system in c, k,a n dπ. The monetary sub-system is
characterized by one state variable (k) and two forward-looking variables (c, π).
Proposition 1 Monetary dynamics
Consider the dynamic sub-system in c, k, π implied by the matrix (31).
1) Assume monetary policy is passive. Then, dynamics are always determinate.
2) Assume monetary policy is active. Then, dynamics are never determinate. There exists
ac r i t i c a lv a l u eq>0 such that dynamics are indeterminate of degree 1 if fM >q .
Proof: With one state variable and two forward-looking variables, dynamics are deter-
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Tr(Jc,k,π)=( 1 − γ)
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denote the determinant and the trace of the 3x3−matrix Jc,k,π, respectively. Assume
fM < 0. Then, Det(Jc,k,π) < 0 and Tr(Jc,k,π) > 0, implying one negative and two
positive eigenvalues. Assume fM > 0. Then, Det(Jc,k,π) > 0, i.e. dynamics are never
determinate. Note that Tr(Jc,k,π) is a linear function of fM, and Tr(Jc,k,π) < 0 obtains
if fM becomes suﬃciently large. Hence, there exists a critical value q such that Jc,k,π has
two negative and one positive eigenvalues, implying dynamics are indeterminate of degree
1 if fM >q . ¤
Proposition 1 reﬂects the fact that local stability types of steady states under monetary
dynamics depend on the single feedback parameter fM. The critical value fM =0deﬁnes
the boundary value for the unique parameter region of determinacy.15 It is worth pointing
out that in the New Keynesian version of the model of Blanchard (1985), as developed in
this paper, passive (and not active) monetary policy is a necessary and suﬃcient condition
for determinate dynamics. Since the model is in many ways standard, the failure of the
Taylor-principle may seem surprising, but there are two non-standard elements. First,
labour supply is assumed to be ﬁxed. Second, monetary policy has non-trivial supply-
side eﬀects because of the contemporaneous link between the real interest rate and the
return on physical capital, as recently discussed in Dupor (2001) and Carlstrom and Fuerst
(2005). We show below that the failure of the Taylor-principle is entirely due to the
second aspect. More speciﬁcally, we show, at the expense of more tedious algebra, that
the classiﬁcation of Proposition 1 remains unaﬀected if one augments preferences with
a standard elastic or even linear labour supply speciﬁcation. However, since the Taylor
14We do not distinguish explicitly between real and conjugate complex eigenvalues, i.e. our classiﬁcation
refers to the real part of any eigenvalue which is crucial for the stability behaviour.
15For small positive values of f
M one obtains Det(J
c,k,π) > 0 and Tr(J
c,k,π) > 0 such that f
M =0
separates a region of determinacy from a region of instability (i.e. all three eigenvalues are positive).
14principle itself is qualitatively not important for the main results of this paper, given our
focus on the dependence of the nature of local dynamics on the level of government debt,
we delegate this discussion to a self-contained analysis in Section 5.








Figure 2: Monetary and ﬁscal dynamics: Ricardian consumers
4.1.2 Monetary and ﬁscal dynamics
Under Ricardian consumers it is straightforward to extend any clear-cut characterization
of the monetary sub-dynamics, as summarized in Proposition 1, to a characterization of
the combined monetary and ﬁscal dynamics. Fiscal policy adds a second state variable
(b) and an additional eigenvalue λ = θ−fF. This eigenvalue is negative (positive) if ﬁscal
policy is passive (active). Combining this pattern with Proposition 1, one obtains:
Proposition 2 Monetary and ﬁscal dynamics
Consider the dynamic system in b, c, k, π implied by the matrix (31).
1) Assume monetary and ﬁscal policy are passive. Then, dynamics are always determinate.
2) Assume monetary and ﬁscal policy are active. Then, dynamics are determinate if
fM >q ,with q as established in Proposition 1.
3) Assume monetary policy is passive and ﬁscal policy is active or, alternatively, monetary
policy is active and ﬁscal policy is passive. Then, dynamics are never determinate.
Proposition 2 summarizes that ﬁscal policy contributes to the local stability properties of
steady states in a rather mechanical way if consumers are Ricardian. Essentially, whenever
the monetary sub-dynamics by themselves are determinate, this feature will be preserved if
ﬁscal policy behaves passively, i.e. if government debt dynamics evolve in a self-stabilizing
manner. By contrast, active ﬁscal policy is decisive for the achievement of determinate
dynamics whenever the monetary sub-dynamics exhibit one degree of indeterminacy. Intu-
itively, in this situation active ﬁscal policy ensures that arbitrary expectations of inﬂation
15can no longer be validated in equilibrium since the local stability requirement of govern-
ment debt imposes uniquely deﬁned values for the forward-looking variables (c, π). This
same mechanism is also at the heart of the ‘ﬁscal theory of the price level’, as developed
by Woodford (1994) and Sims (1994).
For future reference, Figure 2 illustrates how the assumption of Ricardian consumers
reduces the joint design problem of monetary and ﬁscal policy-making to two separable
problems which can be recursively addressed. Shaded areas describe the parameter regions
of determinacy established in Proposition 2. These regions are separated by the demar-
cation line of active vs. passive ﬁscal policy-making (fF = θ) and they are independent
of the target level of government debt. Again, we point out that this qualitative result
does in no way depend on the failure of the Taylor-principle in Section 4.1.1 on monetary
dynamics. Similarly, a richer monetary feedback-rule (reacting, for example, also to some
measure of real economic activity along the lines of Woodford (2003)), leading to a crit-
ical value diﬀerent from fM =0 , can be accommodated with the same logic, as long as
government debt dynamics remain separable.
4.2 Non-Ricardian consumers (ξ > 0)
Owing to the non-Ricardian structure, consumption dynamics are now, in general, aﬀected
by the dynamics of government debt, implying that the transition matrix J in (30) is no
longer separable with respect to ﬁscal policy. Reﬂecting the non-neutral role of ﬁscal policy,
the entries of J in (30) depend crucially on the ‘position’ of the high-activity steady state
(EH) which itself depends on ﬁscal policy. In particular, for any given level of g, the levels
of c, k and r depend on the steady-state mix between bonds and taxes in a non-trivial
manner, as summarized in Lemma 1.
To assess the implications of the non-Ricardian structure for the local dynamics of steady
states it is instructive, in a ﬁrst step, to investigate the necessary condition for determinacy
Det(J)=[ r − fF][σ0 + σ1fM]+rσ2fM > 0 (34)
where the coeﬃcients σ0, σ1, and σ2 are functions of the ﬁscal parameters. Notice that all
technical results used from now onwards in this Subsection are summarized in Appendix 3.
Rearranging (34) one obtains for the critical demarcation line Det(J)=0the expression
Det(J)=0⇔ fF = r(1 +
σ2fM
σ0 + σ1fM ).
4.2.1 Eﬃcient steady states
Assume ﬁrst that steady states are eﬃcient, implying that there is for a given level of g
a one-to-one relationship between taxes and debt, i.e. g<τ < τ∗ ⇒ 0 <b<b ∗. Then,
depending on the level of debt, Det(J)=0has two distinct conﬁgurations in fM − fF−
space which can be graphed as in Figures 3(a) and (b). To relate these two graphs to the
previous discussion notice that if ξ =0the locus of Det(J)=0coincides, irrespective of
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Det(J)>0, Tr(J)<0: Suﬃcient condition for local determinacy
- - -
Figure 3: Monetary and ﬁscal dynamics: non-Ricardian consumers
the level of debt, in both cases with the demarcation lines of active vs. passive policy-
making (i.e. fF = r and fM =0 ), as graphed in Figure 2. If ξ > 0, however, there
exist two distinct regimes. Intuitively, for small levels of debt the wealth eﬀect is also
small and the parameter region consistent with Det(J) > 0 is close to the combinations
of active and passive policy-making underlying Figure 2.16 As b rises the wealth eﬀect
becomes relatively more important, leading to changes in the steady state levels of c, k,
r and, hence, also in σ0, σ1, and σ2. We show that there exist unique threshold values
τ1 ∈ (g,τ∗) ⇒ b1 ∈ (0,b ∗) which lead to a change in the sign pattern of σ0, σ1, and σ2.
This change implies that at the target level of government debt b1 the locus associated
with Det(J)=0switches from Figure 3(a) to Figure 3(b), l e a d i n gt oaq u a l i t a t i v ec h a n g e
of the local dynamics of the system. Intuitively, there is scope for the existence of such
threshold values because of the endogeneity of the capital stock. This feature ensures that
the wealth eﬀect of government debt aﬀects not only the demand side, but also the supply-
side of the system, since any change in the real interest rate resulting from crowding out
eﬀects shifts the marginal cost schedule of ﬁrms. Figures 3(a) and (b) reveal that this
interaction is very non-linear. In particular, the two regimes, as graphed in Figures 3(a)
and 3(b), have the feature that there always exist regions of the parameter space which are
necessary for locally determinate dynamics at ‘low debt’ steady states, but not at ‘high
16Speciﬁcally, assuming non-Ricardian consumers, it is easy to check within (30) that in the special
caseof of b =0one eigenvalue of J is given by r−f
F. Hence, f
F = r implies Det(J)=0 , similar to Figure
2. However, if b =0there are nevertheless wealth eﬀects associated with the capital stock. Because of this
feature, f
M =0no longer implies Det(J)=0 .
17debt’ steady states, and vice versa.
The reasoning so far is based on a necessary condition. To make it more operational we
combine (34) with the additional trace-condition Tr(J) < 0. It can be established that
Det(J) > 0,T r (J) < 0 (35)
is a suﬃcient condition for locally determinate dynamics.17 From (30), the trace of J is
given by
Tr(J)=ω0 − fF − ω1 · fM, with: (36)
ω0 =3 r − θ +( 1− γ)
y
k




which can be rearranged as
Tr(J)=0⇔ fF = ω0 − ω1 · fM. (37)
Equation (37) describes at all debt levels a straight line with positive intercept and neg-
ative slope in fM − fF− space, leading to the graphical representation of the suﬃciency-
condition given in Figure 3. In sum, this leads to the conclusion:
Proposition 3 Monetary and ﬁscal dynamics at eﬃcient steady states
Assume τ ∈ (g,τ∗) ⇒ b ∈ (0,b ∗).
1) Reﬂecting the non-neutral role of ﬁscal policy, determinacy regions depend on the steady-
state level of debt and they are no longer separated by the demarcation lines of active and
passive ﬁscal policy-making.
2) There exist two qualitatively distinct regimes of local equilibrium dynamics, characterized
by low steady-state debt (i.e. τ ∈ (g,τ1) ⇒ b ∈ (0,b 1)) and high steady-state debt (i.e.
τ ∈ (τ1,τ∗) ⇒ b ∈ (b1,b ∗)). These two regimes have the feature that there always exist
regions of the parameter space which ensure locally determinate dynamics at ‘low debt’
steady states, but not at ‘high debt’ steady states, and vice versa, as graphed in Figures
3(a) and 3(b).
The ﬁr s tp a r to fP r o p o s i t i o n3 summarizes the obvious insight that the assumption of non-
Ricardian consumers leads to a genuine interaction between monetary and ﬁscal policy.
This interaction implies that determinate dynamics require appropriate degrees of activism
and passivism within either rule, and these degrees need to be jointly established. The
second part of Proposition 3, however, is a priori not obvious, because it says that the
level of government debt aﬀects the interaction between monetary and ﬁscal stabilization
policies in a highly non-linear way. In other words, if ﬁscal policy is non-neutral, mean-
ingful characterizations of monetary and ﬁscal stabilization policies are conditional on the
prevailing regime with respect to the target level of government debt. If this dependence is
17To further clarify the diﬀerences between Figures 2 and 3, notice that the shaded areas in Figure 2
are based on a condition which is necessary and coeﬃcient for local determinacy. By contrast, in Figure
3 horizontally shaded areas correspond to a necessary condition, while horizontally and vertically shaded
a r e a sc o r r e s p o n dt oas u ﬃcient condition.
18not made explicit (and policies are solely characterized in terms of the feedback parameters
fF and fM), policy recommendations may well be misleading.
To illustrate this general principle, consider, for the sake of exposition, a combination of ac-
tive monetary and passive ﬁscal policy-making. Under Ricardian consumers, this is never
consistent with determinate dynamics, reﬂecting the failure of the Taylor-principle in Sec-
tion 3 in the isolated monetary sub-dynamics. However, under non-Ricardian consumers
there always exist certain combinations of active monetary and passive ﬁscal policy-making
consistent with determinate dynamics. In other words, conditional on an appropriate spec-
iﬁcation of the passivism of ﬁscal policy, the Taylor principle reappears for certain degrees
of active monetary policy. Yet, depending on whether the steady state is characterized by
low or high debt, these combinations show signiﬁcant diﬀerences.
Corollary 1 Active monetary and passive ﬁscal policy at eﬃcient steady states
1) Consider steady states with low debt, i.e. 0 <b<b 1. Then, if monetary policy becomes
more active, the ﬁscal discipline consistent with determinate dynamics decreases.
2) Consider steady states with high debt, i.e. b1 <b<b ∗. Then, if monetary policy
becomes more active, the ﬁscal discipline consistent with determinate dynamics increases,
but remains bounded from above.
4.2.2 Ineﬃcient steady states
For completeness, we extend the analysis to ineﬃcient steady states, i.e. in terms of Figure
1(b) we focus on ineﬃciently high tax rates τ ∈ (τ∗,τ) which are associated with debt levels
b ∈ (b,b∗). Under this assumption, there emerges a third region of the parameter space
with distinct equilibrium dynamics, as illustrated in Figure 3(c).
Proposition 4 Monetary and ﬁscal dynamics at ineﬃcient steady states
Assume τ ∈ (τ∗,τ) ⇒ b ∈ (b,b∗). Then, the non-neutrality features of Proposition 3
extend to a third regime with qualitatively distinct local equilibrium dynamics, as graphed
in Figure 3(c).
Proposition 4 extends Proposition 3 in a straightforward manner. Essentially, it says that
if the relationship between taxes and debt becomes non-monotonic (in line with the logic
of Laﬀer curves) the target level of debt no longer summarizes all the relevant information
on which characterizations of stabilization policies should be conditioned. Instead, the
target levels of both taxes and debt need to be made explicit.
Not surprisingly, if non-Ricardian consumers face both high debt and ineﬃciently high
taxes this leads to local equilibrium dynamics which diﬀer from the benchmark case of
Ricardian consumers in the strongest possible way, as shown in Figure 3(c).T os u m m a r i z e
the characteristics of this third regime, it is instructive to focus again on combinations of
active monetary and passive ﬁscal policy-making.
Corollary 2 Active monetary and passive ﬁscal policy at ineﬃcient steady states
19Consider ineﬃcient steady states, i.e. τ ∈ (τ∗,τ) ⇒ b ∈ (b,b∗). Then, if monetary policy
becomes more active, the ﬁscal discipline consistent with determinate dynamics increases
without bound.18
Remark: All technical results stated in Section 4.2 are derived in Appendix 3. ¤
5 Endogenous labour supply of Ricardian consumers
This self-contained section has the purpose to identify the mechanism which leads to
the failure of the Taylor-principle under Ricardian consumers (ξ =0 ), as established
in Proposition 1. Speciﬁcally, the Section shows that this failure is not caused by the
assumption of a ﬁxed labour supply which this paper has borrowed from the original
contribution of Blanchard (1985).19 Instead, the failure of the Taylor principle is due
to the contemporaneous link between the real interest rate and the return on physical
capital in continuous time models, in line with the careful discussions in Dupor (2001) and
Carlstrom and Fuerst (2005).20 M o r e o v e r ,i fb e i n gs u ﬃciently aggressive (fM >q ) active
monetary policy is consistent with non-fundamental ﬂuctuations in activity, resulting from
local indeterminacy of degree 1. The intuition for such non-fundamental ﬂuctuations may
be summarized as follows. Assume ﬁrst that the labour supply is ﬁxed. Moreover, assume
that inﬂation is expected to be above target, triggering an expected rise in the real interest
rate under active monetary policy. Via arbitrage this implies that the rental rate on capital
needs to rise as well. This in turn requires, for a predetermined level of the capital stock
and a ﬁxed labour supply, a lower mark-up charged in the ﬁnal goods sector. This channel
is on impact expansionary, and the associated rise in actual inﬂation may well become
self-fulﬁlling under a consumption proﬁle that follows on impact a rising path (supported
by an increase in investment and output), before gradually returning to the initial steady
state.21 By contrast, if monetary policy is passive, such self-fulﬁlling expectations can
never be validated, leading to locally determinate dynamics.
The assumption of an elastic labour supply reinforces this logic since self-fulﬁlling increases
in the inﬂation rate and the real interest rate under active monetary policy can now
be supported through a second margin, namely an increase in the labour supply. To










s] · e−θ(s−t)ds, (38)
18This statement is subject to the caveat expressed in Footnote 10.
19There is a separate discussion in the literature of how to equip non-Ricardian consumers (ξ > 0)w i t h
an endogenous labour supply, as discussed, in particular, by Ascari and Rankin (2004). Since we go in the
main part of the analysis with the model of Blanchard (1985), this discussion does not aﬀect our paper.
20Alternative mechanisms challenging the logic of the Taylor principle are discussed, among others, in
Benhabib et al. (2001a), Carlstrom and Fuerst (2001), and Gali et al. (2004).
21The fact that a self-fulﬁlling burst in inﬂation comes together with an increase in the real interest
rate may be intuitively classiﬁed as a dominance of supply-side over demand-side eﬀects. However, any




s ∈ (0,1) denotes the ﬂexible level of individual labour supply and ψ > 0 denotes
the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion to variations in leisure. Accordingly, individual




s/ws)1/ψ. Compared with the
previously derived set of aggregate equilibrium conditions (10)-(20), the assumption of
























replace (15) and (16), respectively.22 Similar to the analysis in Section 4.1, the new set of
aggregate equilibrium conditions gives rise to a unique steady state which is characterized






denote the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of the labour supply with respect to the real
wage. Then, as derived in Appendix 4, local dynamics around the unique steady state are
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i.e. the transition matrix J in (42) generalizes the previously discussed matrix (31) by
allowing for an elastic labour supply.23 Consider the monetary dynamics of (42) in c, k,
and π. Then, Det(Jc,k,π) and Tr(Jc,k,π) are given by Det(Jc,k,π)=η1fM and Tr(Jc,k,π)=




































22Moreover, (21) generalizes to yt = wtnt +(rt +δ)kt +Ωt, without aﬀecting, however, the residual role
of this identity.
23T os e et h el i n kb e t w e e nt h et w om a t r i c e s ,n o t i c et h a ta sψ →∞the labour supply becomes fully
inelastic (i.e. ‘ﬁxed’). Correspondingly,
1
1+ε → 0 and
ε
1+ε → 1, and (42) converges against (31).
21The sign pattern of the coeﬃcients η1, η2, and η3 is the same as in (32) and (33). This
implies that Propositions 1 and 2 remain unchanged if preferences allow for an elastic
labour supply.24
Finally, to link the analysis of this Section explicitly to Dupor (2001), consider the par-
ticularly tractable case of a linear labour supply, as given by ψ → 0. Then, since 1
1+ε → 1
and ε























and the sign pattern of all entries of (43) is identical to the matrix investigated in detail
by Dupor (2001, p. 92). Since the dynamics of c and π are independent of the capital
stock dynamics, one eigenvalue of the 3x3−dynamics can be directly read oﬀ from (43),
i.e. λ =
y
k − δ > 0.25 Exploiting this special feature, Dupor oﬀers a particularly transpar-
ent discussion of why the Taylor principle has no bite if there exists a contemporaneous
link between the real interest rate and the return on physical capital in continuous time
models.26
However, the failure of the Taylor principle in models with capital stock dynamics is not
a generic feature of discrete time models, as shown by Carlstrom and Fuerst (2005).27
Intuitively, discrete time models allow for a natural distinction between the marginal
productivity of ‘today’ and of the ‘future’. If one relates the real interest rate to the
future marginal productivity of capital this essentially removes the binding restriction on
the return rates which causes the failure of the Taylor principle in continuous time.28 It
is for this reason that we emphasized early on that our paper does not give new insights
on the role of the Taylor principle per se. However, our result that the nature of local
determinacy requirements varies with the level of government debt is likely to be a robust
result in models which include capital and non-Ricardian consumers even if we introduce
24Numerically, the critical value q will be diﬀerent, but this does not aﬀect the nature of Propositions 1
and 2.
25Dupor introduces nominal rigidities through utility-based price adjustment costs, while this paper uses
Calvo contracts. This diﬀerence, however, does not aﬀect the qualitative reduced-form feature of separable
capital stock dynamics under a linear labour supply.
26Related to this, see also the discussion of the Taylor principle after Proposition 6 in Benhabib et al.
(2001b). In particular, the paper points out that the Taylor principle becomes fragile if the sign of the
derivative of dπ with respect to π is ambiguous because of feedbacks between the nominal interest rate





the ambiguity of the sign of this term arises because changes in the interest rate (in response to inﬂation
changes) aﬀect marginal costs of ﬁrms.
27Similarly, see Li (2002). Moreover, Lubik (2003), also using a discrete time speciﬁcation, shows that
the eﬀects of capital stock dynamics in this context depend critically on the degree of strucural distortions
in the economy.
28In line with this reasoning, Annicchiarico et al. (2005), using a discrete time version of Blanchard
(1985), discuss monetary and ﬁscal interactions by means of stochastic simulations in which the Taylor-
principle plays a signiﬁcant role. However, the paper does not discuss the role of government debt in a
systematic way.
22mechanisms for reinstating the Taylor principle in versions of the model which ignore ﬁscal
policy.
6C o n c l u s i o n
This paper starts out from the observation that in the New Keynesian paradigm ﬁscal
policy traditionally plays no prominent role. While monetary policy rules, typically spec-
iﬁed as interest rate rules with feedbacks to endogenous variables like inﬂation or output,
have been analyzed in great analytical detail, there is no similarly rich literature on the
appropriate use of ﬁscal instruments. It is well understood that this asymmetric treatment
is adequate in models in which ﬁscal policy acts through variations in lump-sum taxes in
an environment of Ricardian equivalence, ensuring that the joint design problem of mone-
tary and ﬁscal policy-making essentially reduces to two separable problems which can be
recursively addressed. The main contribution of this paper is to show within a simple and
tractable framework how this logic needs to be modiﬁed in an environment which departs
from Ricardian equivalence, implying that equilibrium dynamics are driven by a genuine
interaction of monetary and ﬁscal policy.
To this end, we develop a New Keynesian version of the model of Blanchard (1985) in
which, assuming that all taxation is lump-sum, departures from Ricardian equivalence
can be conveniently modelled through a change in the probability of death of consumers.
If this probability is strictly positive (i.e. if consumers are ‘non-Ricardian’), Ricardian
equivalence ceases to hold and government debt turns into a relevant state variable which
needs to be accounted for in the analysis of local equilibrium dynamics. Assuming simple
policy feedback rules in the spirit of Leeper (1991), our analysis of local steady-state dy-
namics shows that there exist, depending on the assumed target level of government debt,
two qualitatively distinct regimes characterized by ‘low’ and ‘high’ steady-state levels of
debt. These regimes arise since wealth eﬀects of government debt in the Euler equation
lead to non-trivial demand and supply eﬀects, which interact diﬀerently at diﬀerent levels
of steady-state debt and which are related to the endogeneity of the capital stock in the
model of Blanchard. Speciﬁcally, our model implies that in the high (low) debt regime
the degree of ﬁscal discipline, which is needed to ensure locally determinate dynamics,
increases (decreases) if monetary policy becomes more active. More generally speaking,
this leads to the conclusion that, if ﬁscal policy is non-neutral, meaningful characteriza-
tions of monetary and ﬁscal stabilization policies are conditional on the prevailing regime
of the target level of government debt. If this dependence is not made explicit, policy
recommendations may well be misleading.
These rich ﬁndings contrast strongly with an environment populated by ‘Ricardian’ con-
sumers, characterized by a zero probability of death. Under this assumption, the wealth ef-
fect of government debt in the Euler equation vanishes and the economy converges against
a Ramsey-economy characterized by Ricardian equivalence. Consequently, government
debt is no longer an informative state variable and local steady-state dynamics can be
assessed without reference to the target level of government debt.
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A p p e n d i x1 :P r o o fo fL e m m a1
Steady states of (24) and (25) satisfy
ξ(ξ + θ) ·
k + b
r(k) − θ






















































¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
(25)




Assume τ = g ⇔ b =0 . Then
dc
dk





























Hence, Assumption (A 1) is suﬃcient to ensure that at τ = g equation (24) intersects





r > 0, db
d τ
¯ ¯













− (1 − γ)
y
k
+ δ =0 , (44)
with (44) deﬁning by continuity of all expressions implicitly a unique value τ∗ ∈ (g,τ)
with associated value b∗ which maximizes steady-state debt.
Appendix 2: Linearized inﬂation dynamics
To establish equation (29) used in the main text we proceed in three steps. First, starting








(r + α)[b ps + d MCs] · e−(r+α)(s−t)ds.
Diﬀerentiating this expression with respect to time, using the Leibnitz rule, gives
dd p(z)t =( r + α)(d p(z)t − b pt − d MCt).







αd p(z)s · e−α(t−s)ds.
Note that db pt =
·
pt
p ≡ πt and d2b pt ≡ dπt. Diﬀerentiating b pt w i t hr e s p e c tt ot i m eg i v e s
db pt ≡ πt = α(d p(z)t − b pt),
i.e. inﬂation will be positive whenever ‘newly adjusted prices rise relatively more strongly
than average prices’. As regards changes in inﬂation, inﬂation accelerates (dπt =
·
πt > 0)
whenever the ‘inﬂation rate of newly set prices’ (dd p(z)t) exceeds the (average) inﬂation
rate (db pt = πt), with dπt given by
dπt = α[(r + α)(d p(z)t − b pt − d MCt) − α(d p(z)t − b pt)] = rπt − α(r + α) d MCt. (45)
Third, combining (12), (16) and (17), marginal costs evolve approximately according to,
d MCt = γ b wt +( 1− γ)b pk









which is equation (29) used in the main text.
Appendix 3: Determinacy conditions under non-Ricardian consumers
As referred to in the main text, the determinant of the matrix J in (30) is given by
Det(J)=[ r − fF][σ0 + σ1fM]+rσ2fM, with:
























































where we use from (24) the cashless steady-state condition ξ(ξ + θ)=( r − θ)c/(k + b).
From Appendix 1, note that
dc
dk





¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
(25)
⇔ σ1 + σ2 > 0,
25and τ = τ∗ ⇔ σ1 =0 , according to (44). Note that σ2 > 0 is always satisﬁed, while the
signs of σ0 and σ1 are a priori ambiguous. Consider the situation of a balanced primary
budget with τ = g ⇔ b =0 . Then, σ0|τ=g =
(r−θ)r
k [g −γy] < 0 because of (A 1), implying
σ1|τ=g > 0. Rewrite σ0 as σ0 =( r − θ)r[(1 − γ)
y
k − δ −
ξ(ξ+θ
r−θ ] to see that σ0 continuously
rises in τ, since both r and
y
k rise in τ. Starting out from τ = g consider a rise in τ,







(25) , i.e. σ1 = −σ2 < 0. This implies that as τ rises from g to τ there exist
by continuity three distinct qualitative patterns of
Det(J)=0⇔ fF = r(1 +
σ2fM
σ0 + σ1fM )
characterized by
(a) τ ∈ (g,τ1) ⇒ b ∈ (0,b 1):σ0 < 0, σ1 > 0, σ2 > 0;
(b) τ ∈ (τ1,τ∗) ⇒ b ∈ (b1,b ∗):σ0 > 0, σ1 > 0, σ2 > 0;
(c) τ ∈ (τ∗,τ) ⇒ b ∈ (b,b∗):σ0 > 0, σ1 < 0, σ2 > 0,
with representations as shown in Figures 3(a) − (c).
As regards the suﬃcient condition for determinacy, note that
Det(J) > 0,T r (J) < 0
implies that eigenvalues must follow the pattern λ1 > 0, λ2 > 0, λ3 < 0, λ4 < 0 or,
alternatively, λ1 < 0, λ2 < 0, λ3 < 0, λ4 < 0. However, the structure of J in (30) is such
that the second pattern of four negative eigenvalues can never occur. To prove this, we
invoke the ‘quasi-negative deﬁniteness’ criterion as stated, for example, in Gandolfo (1996,
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A set of necessary and suﬃcient conditions for all four eigenvalues of J to be negative is
that the leading minors of B alternate in sign, beginning with minus. In our case, the
ﬁrst leading minor will only be negative if r<f F. However, this implies, since r>θ, that
the second leading minor must also be negative, ruling out the possibility of four negative
eigenvalues. Hence, Det(J) > 0,Tr (J) < 0 implies λ1 > 0, λ2 > 0, λ3 < 0, λ4 < 0. ¤
Appendix 4: Endogenous labour supply of Ricardian consumers (ξ =0 )
a) Steady state discussion





















26Assuming ξ =0 , the aggregate consumer Euler equation (10) implies r(k/n)=θ,i . e .t h e
steady-state capital intensity and the two factor prices w and r are uniquely pinned down
by θ. The two remaining steady-state relationships are given by the aggregate resource
constraint













ψ ⇔ c = w(1 − n)ψ.
With w and k/n being ﬁxed by θ, these two equations have two unknowns, i.e. c and n.
Combining the two equations yields an expression in n, i.e.







Consider n ∈ (0,1). Then, the LHS falls continuously in n, while the RHS rises continuously
in n, i.e. for appropriate values of g there exists a unique steady state with positive activity
levels.
b) Derivation of the transition matrix J in equation (42)
Notice that the ﬁrst two rows of (42), describing the dynamics of b bt and b ct, are the same
as in (31).
Linearized capital stock dynamics:
To derive the third row of (42), describing the dynamics of b kt, we start out from the




t − δkt − ct − g which can be approximated as
db kt = −
c
k
b ct +[ ( 1− γ)
y
k




To substitute out for b nt, linearize the two new equations (39) and (41), yielding b ct − b wt =
−εb nt and b kt − b nt +
fM

































which corresponds to the third row of (42).
Linearized inﬂation dynamics:
To derive the fourth row of (42), describing the dynamics of πt, we start out from equation
(45) derived in Appendix 2, i.e.
dπt = θπt − α(θ + α) d MCt,
27and recognize that with a ﬂexible labour supply marginal costs evolve approximately
according to d MCt = γ b wt +( 1− γ)b pk
t = γ(b kt − b nt)+
fM
θ+δπt, w h e r ew eh a v eu s e db kt − b nt +
fM
θ+δπt = b wt. Substituting out for b nt from above, yields
d MCt = γ
1
1+ε











dπt = −α(θ + α)γ
1
1+ε
b ct − α(θ + α)γ
ε
1+ε







which corresponds to the fourth row of (42).
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